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REGISTRATION OF HEDGE FUND ADVISERS
UNDER THE INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
"Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light
the most efficient policeman."'
A hedge fund, typically an unregulated investment vehicle for
the affluent investor, holds a variety of securities and other assets.
2
Currently, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
maintains little reliable data on the hedge fund industry, yet instances
of illegal activity involving hedge funds continue to catch the
agency's attention.3  The SEC has identified fraud, misuse of
leverage, and speculation as the industry's leading problems.4 These
problems include recent late-trading and market-timing scandals, as
well as the 1999 collapse of the massively overleveraged hedge fund
run by Long Term Capital Management. The agency's concerns
about hedge funds parallel the concerns that Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's administration had about investment trusts and their kin
in the early 1930s. 5 Those concerns led the New Deal administration
to pioneer the regulatory framework for securities that is currently in
effect.
Today, the hedge fund industry operates in a pre-New Deal state
of regulation. Maintaining this status quo means that the SEC
remains in the dark about many incidents of abuses by hedge fund
advisors. Without any reliable data, the SEC cannot prevent abuses
1. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY, AND How BANKERS
USE IT 92 (A. M. Kelley 2d ed. 1986) (1914).
2. See infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
3. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund
Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,172 (July 28, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
275, 279) [hereinafter SEC Proposed Rule].
4. See id.
5. See infra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
2147
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 38:2147
that harm hedge fund and ordinary investors and that potentially
harm world markets. Pressing the full weight of federal securities
regulations on the hedge fund industry would be consistent with the
hedge fund industry with the historical development of securities
law. Such an approach, however, is not necessary, nor politically
feasible, at this time. A more sensible policy dictates that the SEC
require, as the SEC board finally approved in October 2004,6 that
hedge fund advisers register with the agency. This would enable the
SEC to: (i) begin to understand the hedge fund industry, (ii) attempt
to curb illegal activity of individual funds and their advisers, and (iii)
prevent market disruptions by monitoring overleveraged funds.
Although the SEC proposed rule of registering hedge fund
advisers won a three to two executive board vote, the rule does not
require full compliance until 2006. The rule faced, and continues to
face, intense opposition. According to one calculation, 73 percent of
letters during the comment period for the SEC proposal opposed
registration. 7 The voices of opposition include top law firms, hedge
fund groups,9 and some writers in the academic legal community.
10
These groups mostly advance provocative economic arguments
against registration, including arguing that registration would impede
the hedge fund industry's growth.
Conspicuously absent on both sides of the registration discourse,
is any attempt to examine hedge funds in the historical context of
securities regulation. This Note shows that many issues that drove
the original federal securities regulations are the same issues driving
the push to regulate the hedge fund industry today, and explains why
the current controversy concerning the hedge fund industry should
6. See Press Release, SEC Proposes Securities Offering Reform, Requires
Registration of Hedge Fund Investment Advisers (Oct. 27, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-150.htm [hereinafter SEC Press Release].
7. Managed Funds Association, The SEC's Proposal: The Public
Commentary-A Summary, available at http://www.mfainfo.org/images/PDF/
SEC-Summary-Comments-Memo.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2005) [hereinafter
Managed Funds Comment].
8. Id.; see also Letter from Marianne K. Smythe et al., Director, Division
of Investment Management, Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale & Dorr LLP, to
Jonathan Katz, Secretary, Securities & Exchange Commission 9 (Sept. 8,
2004) [hereinafter Hale & Dorr Letter].
9. Managed Funds Comment, supra note 7.
10. See, e.g., ERIK J. GREUPNER, Hedge Funds Are Headed Down-market:
A Call for Increased Regulation?, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1555 (2003).
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ultimately be resolved in favor of registration.
Part II of this Note examines the context and purpose behind the
securities regulation framework currently in place in the United
States. It is important to examine the circumstances and the intent
under which those regulations were passed in order to understand
why registering hedge fund advisers is consistent with the overall
scheme of securities regulation.
Part III of this Note first describes what is generally known
about the hedge fund industry. The focus then shifts to the details of
how hedge funds avoid the complex securities regulations of the
New Deal. Part III also explains the problems of fraud, leverage, and
speculation that the hedge fund industry imposes onto investors and
world markets as a whole.
Part IV supports registration as the proper method of dealing
with these risks posed by the hedge fund industry. Finally, Part IV
of this Note analyzes the utility of registration and the arguments
against it. By placing the current issue of hedge fund regulation in
an historical perspective, this Note shows that the SEC's October
2004 decision 1 to require the registration of hedge fund advisers is
necessary and consistent with the overall goals of securities
regulation.
II. SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE
INVESTMENT TRUSTS OF THE 1920s
The hedge fund industry currently operates under a regulatory
scheme similar to that of the 1920s securities industry.
Consequently, an overview of the securities industry during this
period will illustrate how the current problems posed by the hedge
fund industry are reminiscent of the securities problems that the New
Deal Administration sought to address.
A. State Regulations and Problems in the
Securities Industry During the 1920s and the Depression Era
Understanding why hedge funds adviser registration comports
with the overall scheme of New Deal securities regulation first
11. See SEC Press Release, supra note 6.
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requires examining the circumstances surrounding the passage of
those regulations. Before the Federal Government established the
elaborate securities regulations of the New Deal, states had passed
their own Blue Sky12 laws to regulate securities. By 1933 all states
but Nevada had some securities or Blue Sky laws.' 3 The Blue Sky
laws were ineffective for many reasons including: (i) lobby efforts by
the Investment Bankers Association, (ii) use of the mails to conduct
securities operations across state lines, and (iii) reluctance by states
to pass or enforce tough measures that may distract industry from the
State. 14
Large, uninformed increases in investor speculation in securities
markets and large increases in securities fraud characterized the Blue
Sky regulation period. 15 Congress estimates that about half of the
almost $50 billion worth of new securities issued after World War I
are actually worthless.
16
Promoters and managements inspired and profited by this
buying extravaganza. In their.., desire to get a portion of
this easy capital they issued securities for overvalued
properties, pyramided and complicated corporate structures,
over-expanded, [and] over-borrowed ... . [B]ankers like-
wise too frequently forgot their duty of counselors ... they
12. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 44 (1982).
The blue sky laws .were so named because they were "intended to check stock
swindlers so barefaced they 'would sell building lots in the blue sky."' Id.
13. Id. at 45.
14. See Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment:
A Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 332-33 (1988) (citing Federal
Securities Act: Hearings on H.R. 4314 Before the H. Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Comm., 73d Cong. 99, 100 (1933) (DEPT. OF COMMERCE, A STUDY
OF THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSED FEDERAL
SECURITIES ACT), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES
ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 item 20, at 100 (comp.
by J.S. Ellenberger & E. Mahar 1973)). The Investment Bankers Association
riddled local securities laws with so many exceptions that they were essentially
ineffectual. SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 45. By operating across state lines,
securities traded through interstate commerce came under the regulatory
purview of the U.S. Congress, not the states. Id.
15. Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 14, at 335.
16. Id. at 334 (citing H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933), reprinted in 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 item 18, at 2 (comp. by J.S. Ellenberger & E. Mahar
1973)).
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reaped a harvest on the popularity of management and fixed
trusts. '
7
"[S]everal million citizens with small incomes were raiding their
savings, reducing their immediate purchasing power and mortgaging
their future in order to speculate. Ninety percent of these market
transactions in the twenties, it has been estimated, were gambling
ventures rather than permanent investments."'1 8 Investors were often
exploited, and accounting scandals typified by "duplicity in
bookkeeping"'19 were common. Holding companies and pyramid
schemes proliferated, fooling investors into thinking they were
investing in prosperous businesses when they really were investing
in pools of debt laced with deceptive bookkeeping.
20
This era also saw the rise of the investment trusts into which
over four and a half million Americans placed their savings,
ultimately losing an estimated three billion dollars.21 In the four-year
period from 1926 to 1929, the "good times," the number of
investment trust companies grew by 600 and their total assets
increased from $1 billion to $8 billion.22 A variety of financial
players, including large investment houses, operated investment
trusts that typically consisted of pooled investment vehicles and
often were used to hedge risk.23 The trusts "were little better than
gambling establishments in which the innocent patron intrusted [sic]
his stakes not even to a fellow player picked at random but to the
croupier-whose main interest, of course, was to represent 'the
house.'"24 Most trusts resisted disclosing their holdings, as required
to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and consequently,
traded mainly in Boston and Chicago.
25 Trusts often used leverage26
17. Id. at 335 n.58 (quoting Laylin K. James, The Securities Act of 1933, 32
MICH. L. REV. 624, 626 (1934)).
18. DIXON WECTER, THE AGE OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION 5 (MacMillan
Co. 1952).
19. Id.
20. See id. at 5-6.
21. Id. at 6.
22. SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 222.
23. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929, at 46-65
(Houghton Mifflin Co. 1979).
24. WECTER, supra note 18, at 6.
25. GALBRAITH, supra note 23, at 49. Highly respected trust managers
favored refusal of the hedge funds to disclose holdings as a prudent move to
prevent runs on securities. Id.
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aggressively, a practice that some critics attributed to be a main
cause of the 1929 stock market crash."
Despite the prevalence of fraud, speculation and the lack of
transparency2 8 in the investment industry, the twenties were a time of
great economic growth in the United States.29 Manufacturing and
output rose steadily, as did industrial production and business
earnings. 30 From May 1924 to the end of 1927, the New York Times
industrial average increased almost 150%.
31
Growth and speculation ran their course "[b]etween September
1, 1929, and July 1, 1932, [when] the value of all stocks listed on the
New York Stock Exchange shrank from a total of nearly $90 billion
to just under $16 billion- a loss of 83 percent., 32 During a similar
period, the value of New York Stock Exchange bonds declined from
$49 billion to $31 billion.33  Correspondingly, Gross National
Product ("GNP") fell by about a third during this same period.34
Some blamed the stock market crash on "bear raids" or abusive
short selling of securities.3 5 The more widely accepted explanation
26. "In an investment trust leverage was achieved by issuing bonds,
preferred stock, as well as common stock to purchase, more or less exclusively,
a portfolio of common stocks." Id. at 57.
27. Id. at 56-65 (describing investment trusts and their use of leverage); see
also WECTER, supra note 18, at 6-7 (describing the expansion of credit and
investment trusts' use of leverage).
28. "[T]he typical offering circular prior to 1933 contained little of the
information needed to estimate the worth of a security." Keller & Gehlmann,
supra note 14, at 335.
29. While the rich enjoyed the largest economic gains, more and more
people were "well-off." GALBRAITH, supra note 23, at 2.
30. From the early to mid-twenties until 1928, the number of manufacturing
establishments increased from 183,900 to 206,700 with a corresponding rise in
the output value from $60.8 billion to $68 billion, and the Federal Reserve
index of industrial production rose from 67 to 110. Id. at 2-3 (citing U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United States, 1944-45, FED. RES. BULL., Dec. 1929).
31. Id. at 7-9. The New York Times industrial average increased during
this period from 106 to 245. Id.
32. SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 1.
33. Id. at 1.
34. GALBRAITH, supra note 23, at 168.
35. STAFF OF THE COMMISSION'S DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
AND OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS,
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS: STAFF REPORT TO THE
UNITED STATES SECuRrrIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 40 n.138 (2003)
[hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT] (citing 7 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
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for the crash is overall speculation in the financial markets.3 6 The
Depression has proven more difficult to explain, but probably
resulted from a combination of: (i) great disparities in income, (ii)
fragile corporate structures; (iii) poor banking structures, (iv) trade
imbalance, and (v) flawed economic projections. 37  The Hoover
administration responded to the initial crash by conducting
investigations, holding commission hearings, and seeking voluntary
compliance by corporations with suggested reforms. 38 When these
measures failed to produce results, the American people elected
Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Roosevelt swiftly moved to regulate the
securities markets, employing the skills of Felix Frankfurter, then a
Harvard Law professor, and a host of others.
39
B. The New Deal Response-Federal Securities Regulations
After the Depression took hold, for Roosevelt and the New
Dealers, "[m]aking capitalism live up to its pretensions necessitated a
restoration of public confidence in the governing symbols and basic
currency of the economic order-investment securities. ' A4  In
response, the New Deal securities regulations included: the
Securities Act of 1933 ("SA"),4 1 the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ("SEA"),42 the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("ICA"),
43
and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ("IAA").44  Congress
passed these securities acts intending to protect potential securities
investors."
SECURITIES REGULATION 3203-04 & 3204 n.213 (3d ed. 1989)).
36. GALBRAITH, supra note 23, at 168-71.
37. Id. at 177-86.
38. See SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 2-38. Led by committee counsel
Ferdinand Pecora, the Senate Banking and Currency Committee conducted
investigations instrumental to later securities regulation. Id. at 1-2, 39.
39. See id. at 39-241 (giving a comprehensive account of the New Deal
securities regulations).
40. MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 3
(1970).
41. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
42. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
43. Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
44. Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
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Accordingly, to understand why registering hedge fund advisers
comports with the overall scheme of New Deal securities regulation,
it is important to examine the congressional intent behind those
individual regulations. Any evidence regarding the intent of specific
exceptions and exemptions that hedge funds currently use to avoid
regulation must also be examined.
1. The 1933 Securities Act
In a message to Congress on March 29, 1933, Franklin Delano
Roosevelt said:
Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should not
take any action which might be construed as approving or
guaranteeing that newly issued securities are sound in the
sense that their value will be maintained or that the
properties which they represent will earn profit.
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every
issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce
shall be accompanied by full publicity and information, and
that no essentially important element attending the issue
shall be concealed from the buying public.
45
Congress responded later that same year, enacting the SA largely as a
disclosure statute based on the English Companies Act 4 6 and as one
that remained true to Roosevelt's words.47 The SA's preamble states
the Act's purpose: "to provide full and fair disclosure of the
character of securities sold in interstate commerce... and to prevent
fraud in the sale thereof, and for other purposes.
'A8
45. James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933,
28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 30 (1959) (citing H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2
(1933)). Landis was one of the main drafters of the Securities Act and a
protdg6 of securities regulation champion Felix Frankfurter. SELIGMAN, supra
note 12, at 61-62 (giving a concise account of Landis' legal background).
46. See SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 46.
47. Landis, supra note 45, at 30-49. "The Securities Act of 1933 was
really a 'rotten egg statute.' You could sell all the rotten eggs you wanted if
you told people fully how rotten they were. Alas, a lot of rotten eggs were sold
under this statute and you suspect that a lot of them are continuing to be sold."
Symposium, New Approaches to Disclosure in Registered Security Offerings,
28 Bus. LAW. 505, 505 (1973) (remarks of panelist member A.A. Sommer).
48. Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 14, at 342 n.130 (quoting S. REP. No.
73-47 at 1 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURrrIES
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Nevertheless, the bureaucracy at the time, untrained in complex
securities matters, believed it was unnecessary to regulate
sophisticated investors spending their own money.49 The prevailing
opinion of the drafters was that the federal government should not
concern itself with the sale of securities to a limited group of
experienced investors.50 This idea resulted in the Act's exemption
for sales other than those made by "an issuer, underwriter, or
dealer"" 51 and "transactions "not involving [a] public offering."
52
Thus, the distinction between public and private offerings has set the
scope of the SA.
53
2. The 1934 Securities Exchange Act
"Congress intended the SEA to curb notable exchange abuses,
especially speculation and market manipulation." 54  Congress
designed the SEA to:
establish the Securities and Exchange Commission to
regulate the securities business; require the stock exchanges
to adopt rules of fair dealing; apply the full disclosure
requirements of new securities under the Securities Act to
all securities traded on a national exchange; and instruct the
Federal Reserve Board to regulate the use of borrowed
money in the stock market".
55
Critics of the Act, however, claimed that the SEA was a step toward
communism in the United States, and some "characterized the bill's
proponents variously as radicals or Bolsheviks or 'a bunch of Jews
ACT OF 1933 AND SECURnIEs EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 item 17, at I (comp.
by J.S. Ellenberger & E. Mahar 1973)); see also A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur
D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 40 (1941) (citing the Securities Act of
1933, 48 Stat. 74, 78 (codified as amended at 48 Stat. 881, 905-06 (1934)).
49. See Landis, supra note 45, at 37.
50. Id.; SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953) (holding that
"the exemption question turns on the knowledge of the offerees").
51. Landis, supra note 45, at 37.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2000).
53. Landis, supra note 45, at 37.
54. Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 14, at 348 (citing John E. Tracy &
Alfred Brunson McChesney, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MICH.
L. REv. 1025, 1027 (1934)); Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REv. 385,423 (1990).
55. Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 14, at 347.
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out to get J.P. Morgan.'
' 56
3. The 1940 Investment Company Act
The ICA "is a comprehensive regulatory scheme implemented to
protect investors from abusive practices by those operating
investment companies."57  "Disclosure has been the pervading
philosophy of the SEC and of the other statutes they administer.
Even the [ICA], which is largely regulatory, nonetheless has a large
measure of disclosure requirements." 58 The ICA, however, required
substantial compromise by the Roosevelt administration, and some
critics regard it as a great legislative defeat for the SEC.59
The Act contains an exemption for "[a]ny issuer whose
outstanding securities (other than short-term paper) are beneficially
owned by not more than one hundred persons and which is not
making and does not presently propose to make a public offering of
its securities." 60  This exemption, used by hedge funds, "reflects
Congress' view that privately placed investment companies, owned
by a limited number of investors likely to be drawn from persons
with personal, familial, or similar ties, do not rise to the level of
federal interest."
61
4. The 1940 Investment Advisers Act
Congress intended for the IAA to mitigate the abusive practices
of investment advisers.62 The IAA requires investment advisers to
56. SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 96; see also Keller & Gehlmann, supra
note 14, at 348.
57. Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L.
REv. 681, 693 (2000); see also SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470
F.2d 40, 42 (7th Cir. 1972) (explaining that the ICA is a "comprehensive
regulatory scheme designed to prevent abusive practices by those in control of
investment companies").
58. Sommer, supra note 47, at 505.
59. See SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 222-31.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2000).
61. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers,
69 Fed. Reg. 45,172, 45,173 n.17 (July 28, 2004) [hereinafter SEC Proposed
Rule] (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) (citing Investment Trusts and
Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the S.
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong. 179 (1940)).
62. See SEC v. Capital Gain Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 189-90
(1963) (citing Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, supra note 61,
§ 202); Johnston v. CIGNA Corp., 916 P.2d 643, 646 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996)
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register with the SEC, maintain certain business records, and deliver
63a disclosure statement to the SEC. The Act also creates a fiduciary
duty owed by the adviser to the investor.64 This duty requires the
adviser to: (i) disclose conflicts of interest, (ii) seek the best
execution for transactions, and (iii) have a reasonable basis for
recommendations to the client.
65
The IAA contains a private investor exemption that is currently
utilized by hedge funds. This exemption has no legislative history,
but "the SEC makes clear that "[the exemption] was not intended to
exempt advisers to wealthy or sophisticated clients." 66  Instead,
Congress intended the Act to protect all types of investors who chose
to utilize an investment adviser.67 This broad protection therefore
extends to the highly sophisticated, the naive, those unfamiliar with
their adviser's strategy, and even those investors with too little time
to manage their own investments. 68  By narrowing the categories
included in the private investor exemption (essentially excluding the
hedge funds), the IAA will require hedge fund advisers to register
with the SEC. Consequently, the SEC would further the IAA goal of
protecting all investors that utilize an investment adviser.
In summary, the hedge fund industry presents many of the same
risks that the 1920s' investment trusts posed: fraud, misuse of lever-
age, and speculation. These problems drove securities regulation.
Therefore, applying the IAA to hedge fund advisers is a logical step
in attempting to deal with the problems that the industry poses.
III. HEDGE FUNDS
Many advisers, investors and others in the hedge fund industry
have avoided the registration and regulation requirements of the SA,
(stating the purpose of the Investment Advisers Act (IAA) was to protect the
public from fraud and misrepresentation by unscrupulous advisers); W.T.
Mallison, Jr., The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 1 VAND. L. REv. 68, 69-70
(1947-48) (detailing adviser strategies including matching buyers and sellers
within an adviser's clientele and shifting high quality securities from a client's
account to the adviser's account).
63. SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,172-73.
64. Id.
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SEA, ICA and IAA.69 The little information that exists about the
hedge fund industry must be examined to fully comprehend and
appreciate the significance of this lack of registration and regulation.
A. What Are Hedge Funds?
Generally, the SEC defines a hedge fund as "an entity that holds
a pool of securities and perhaps other assets, whose interests are not
sold in a registered public offering and which is not registered as an
investment company under the Investment Company Act."7 While
no formal definition of a hedge fund exists, almost all agree on some
variant of this definition.
7 1
Hedge funds vary in their trading strategies, generally trading a
diverse array of securities and equities. 72 Hedge funds account for
significant amounts of daily trading on the New York Stock
Exchange and are exceptionally active in the bond markets. By
exploiting arbitrage opportunities and engaging in other investment
strategies, hedge funds are seen by some, including Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Alan Greenspan, as contributing to efficient market
pricing and the liquidity of markets. Other benefits attributed to the
hedge fund industry include: (i) helping investors diversify their
portfolios, (ii) achieving returns uncorrelated to the market, and (iii)
assuming risk from other sectors of the economy by taking
unfavorable trading positions.
73
Many hedge funds are "offshore" hedge funds, incorporated in
places like the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas, the British Virgin
Islands, Panama, and the Netherlands Antilles. Offshore hedge funds
have attracted many investments entities, such as pension funds,
charitable trusts, foundations, and endowments.74
69. See discussion infra Part III.C.
70. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 3.
71. See Gibson, supra note 57, at 683.
72. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 3-4, 33-43 (listing equities,
fixed income securities, "convertible securities, currencies, exchange-traded
futures, over-the-counter derivatives, futures contracts, [and] commodity
options" as traded by hedge funds and long-only equity, arbitrage, and hedging
strategies as employed by hedge funds); Gibson, supra note 57, at 685-86
(listing different trading strategies used by hedge funds with detailed
descriptions).
73. SEC STAFF REFPORT, supra note 35, at 4-5; see SEC Proposed Rule, 69
Fed. Reg. at 45,178; Gibson, supra note 57, at 688.
74. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 10.
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"Hedge funds are usually structured as private limited
partnership[s], or limited liability companies to [maintain] pass
through tax treatment., 75 A general partner, whose compensation is
usually about ten to twenty percent of the fund's profits, typically
manages and makes decisions for the fund.76 Many funds, however,
restrict compensation to managers if the fund does not exceed a
performance benchmark.77 In addition, hedge fund managers often
have significant personal investments in the funds they manage.
78
Investors typically are given little information about the hedge
funds in which they invest because the SA does not require any form
of disclosure to accredited 79 investors.8 0 The theory behind this rule
is "that accredited investors are sophisticated enough and have
enough bargaining power to obtain any information they need from
an issuer in making an investment decision." 8' Nevertheless, to
protect against liability under antifraud provisions of federal
securities laws, unregistered and unregulated hedge funds make
some disclosures in the form of private placement memorandum,
conference calls, informal conversations, and other unofficial
devices. In practice, however, accredited investors hold very little
bargaining power, and beyond what they can discover by hiring
investigators and consultants, essentially take whatever terms and
disclosures hedge funds advisers offer them.
8 2
B. Estimates of Hedge Fund Growth
and the Diversification of Investors
The SEC knows so little about the hedge fund industry that, in
its 2003 Staff Report on the implications of hedge fund growth, it
75. See Gibson, supra note 57, at 683.
76. Id. at 684.
77. See id. at 684 n.17 (citing Scott J. Lederman, Securities Regulation of
Domestic Funds, in NUTS & BOLTS OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS:
UNDERSTANDING THE EVOLVING WORLD OF CAPTIAL MARKET AND
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT PRODUCTS 551, 553 (Clifford E. Kirsch et al.
eds., 1998)).
78. SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,173.
79. Generally the term accredited investor equates to an investor who earns
more than $200,000 per year or meets certain minimum personal wealth
requirements. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1982).
81. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 46 n.161.
82. Id. at 47 n.163.
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admitted that its "staff has no reliable data on the number of hedge
funds in existence or the amount of hedge fund assets under
management." 83 The Report estimated that the industry grew from
about 400 hedge funds in 1992 to approximately 6000 in 2003, and
that the industry was quickly approaching a net worth of one trillion
dollars. 84 By 2003 "[a]bout 44% of the 650,000 American house-
holds with a net worth of at least $5 million had such investments" in
hedge funds and private-equity offerings. 85  While hedge fund
investors have traditionally been individuals and families,
institutional investors today, including cities, university endowments,
foundations, and pension plans account for a significant amount of
the money invested in hedge funds.
86
C. How Hedge Funds Avoid
Registration with and Regulation by the SEC
Hedge funds navigate a complex web of securities acts and rules
to avoid regulation by the SEC. To qualify for exceptions and
exemptions to the SA, SEA, ICA, and IAA, hedge funds limit the
number of their investors, refrain from advertising, and set minimum
83. Id. at 1 n.2.
84. See id. An updated estimate put forth by the SEC shows that the United
States hedge fund industry is now worth at least $795 billion and that there are
about 7000 funds. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund
Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,172, 45,174 (July 28, 2004) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) (citing Regulation of the Hedge Fund Industry: Hearing
Before the H. S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 27
(2004) (testimony of Charles J. Gradante, Managing Principal, The Hennessee
Group LLC), available at http://banking.senate.gov/files/gradante.pdf (last
modified Oct. 27, 2004).
85. Robert Tomsho, Luxury Vehicle: An 18% Return? It Sounded Good to
Rich Investors, WALL ST. J., June 15, 2004, at Al (citing statistics from the
Spectrem Group, a Chicago consulting firm).
86. Endowments and foundations average about ten percent of their
portfolios in hedge funds, with extreme schools such as the University of
Virginia placing sixty percent of their endowment portfolios in hedge funds.
SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,176-77 & 45,177 n.56 (citing Virginia
Exposure Soars to 60%, FIN. NEWS (DAILY), Apr. 28, 2003, available at
http://www.efmancialnews.com/index.cfml?page=archive search&storyref = 18
500000000032608&uid=7805-2111-461800-980527). Pensions have an esti-
mated $72 billion invested in hedge funds. 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,176 n.55 (citing
Regulation of the Hedge Fund Industry, supra note 84 (testimony of Charles J.
Gradante, Managing Principal, The Hennessee Group LLC), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/_files/gradante.pdf (last modified Oct. 27, 2004).
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wealth requirements for investors. Despite these compliance
measures, hedge funds still effectively attract many investors,
including investors of varying incomes.
1. Securities Act of 1933
To avoid registration and prospectus requirements 87 under the
SA, hedge funds rely on the 'Act's private offering exemption under
section 4(2) and Code of Federal Regulations rule 506. 88 Section
4(2) reads, "The provisions of [section 5 (15 U.S.C. § 77e)] shall not
apply to... (2) transactions by an issuer not involving any public
offering." Congress enacted this exemption "to allow issuers to
avoid cumbersome registration requirements when the likelihood that
the public would benefit from the registration was very remote.
' 89
Thus, Congress intended this exemption to apply to private offerings
of wealthy investors where the "public interest is not strongly
implicated." 90
The Supreme Court delineated an anecdotal standard for what
constitutes a public offering in SEC v. Ralston Purina.91 That
standard can be summed in the negative: "[a]n offering to those who
are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction 'not
involving any public offering."' 92 Whether a sale qualifies for the
private offering exemption has been construed by subsequent court
decisions and by the SEC. Considerations include the number of
offerees, their need for information, their access to information, and
the size of the offering.93
87. Registration and prospectus requirements are contained in section 5 of
the Securities Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(b), 77e(c) (2000). Among other require-
ments, the Securities Act mandates that the issuer register with the SEC and
provide investors with an SEC mandated prospectus. See SEC STAFF REPORT,
supra note 35, at 13.
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. (2004); SEC
STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 14; Gibson, supra note 57, at 689. The
exemption seemingly runs contrary to the purpose of the Securities Act, which
was to ensure adequate disclosure to investors. See discussion supra Part
II.B. 1.
89. Gibson, supra note 57, at 689 (citing THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF
SEcuRrrlEs REGULATION 225 (3d ed. 1996)).
90. Id. (citing HAZEN, supra note 89, at 225).
91. 346U.S. 119 (1953).
92. Id. at 125.
93. Gibson, supra note 57, at 690.
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Accordingly, hedge funds ensure that they engage in private
offerings by maintaining thirty-five or fewer investors.94 Under rule
506, this guarantees compliance with section 4(2). 95 Compliance
with rule 506 is sufficient but not necessary to qualify for the private
offering exemption promised by section 4(2).96 Compliance with
rule 506 limits hedge funds to thirty-five investors,97 but this limit is
a farce since "accredited investors" do not count toward the thirty-
five purchaser limit.
98
Hedge funds still sometimes file a "notice of sale" on a Schedule
D form with the SEC within fifteen days of making an exempt sale.
99
Schedule D, however, requires minimal information about the hedge
fund: an explanation of how investor money will be used, fund
expenses, and the amount of securities bought and sold. 00
One negative consequence for a hedge fund using rule 506 is
that the fund must also abide by the requirements of rule 502(c),
limiting almost all forms of advertising. 101 Rule 506 further restricts
investors in that they cannot turn around and resell their investment
94. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 14.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2004).
98. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 14-15 nn.43-44 (discussing the
provisions of rule 506(b)(2)(1) and rule 501(e)(1)(16)). The bar is set low to
qualify as an accredited investor. As delineated in rule 501, an individual need
only have a net worth of over one million dollars or a minimum income of
$200,000 ($300,000 if married) with reasonable expectation of earning
comparable income in the coming year. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at
15; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (defining eight categories of accredited
investors); 17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (defining the term accredited investor). Hedge
fund directors, general partners, and officers are also accredited investors.
SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 15. Institutional- investors, trusts,
employee benefit plans, and the like need only have more than five million
dollars in net assets to be accredited investors. Id. at 15.
99. HEDGE FUNDS INVESTMENT AND PORTFOLIO STRATEGIES FOR THE
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 149 (Jess Lederman & Robert A. Klein eds., 1995)
[hereinafter PORTFOLIO STRATEGIES].
100. Id. Failure to file Schedule D does not affect the availability of the 4(2)
exemption, but can be grounds for the SEC denying future use of the
exemption. Id.
101. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c); SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 16.
In its report on hedge funds, the SEC provides a more detailed description of
advertising restrictions under rule 502 as well as a discussion of issues
involving advertising and the internet. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35,
at 16; see also Gibson, supra note 57, at 690-91.
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in a hedge fund without registering under the SA. 102  Another
negative consequence of using the section 4(2) exception is that it
does not apply when an action is brought pursuant to sections 12(2)
or 17, the anti-fraud provisions of the SA.
103
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Under the SEA, broker-dealers must submit to SEC regulatory
oversight, and investors must report the holding of certain specified
securities positions to the SEC.104 Hedge fund managers, however,
avoid classifications as either brokers or dealers. The SEA defines a
broker as one "engaged in the business of effecting transactions in
securities for the account of others."' 05  It defines a dealer as one
"engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own
account through a broker or otherwise."' 106 Dealer does not include a
bank, or any "person [that] buys or sells securities for his own
account, either individually or in [a] fiduciary capacity, but not as a
part of a regular business."' 0 7 Hedge fund managers are not brokers
because they engage in transactions for their own accounts, not those
of others. 10 8  Similarly, hedge fund managers are not dealers-
neither as they engage in transactions for their own account nor as
part of a regular business.1
0 9
Other registration and reporting provisions contained in section
12 of the SEA take effect when an issuer has 500 "holders of
record,110 of a class of equity security and "assets in excess of $10
million.""' Hedge funds, however, typically avoid registration
102. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 17. An investor can resell his
investment in a hedge fund without registration if there is an applicable
exemption to registration. Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d)). Usually hedge
funds prohibit transfers of investor interests without the written consent of the
general partner or other manager, and "there is limited liquidity of the interests
through sales and redemptions by the hedge funds." Id. at 18.
103. Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 14, at 347 n.183.
104. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-mn (2000); Gibson, supra note 57, at 691.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4).
106. Id. § 78c(a)(5)(A)-(C).
107. Id.
108. See Gibson, supra note 57, at 692.
109. Id.; PORTFOLIO STRATEGIES, supra note 99, at 149-50 (providing a
more detailed look at what constitutes "brokers" and "dealers").
110. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 18-19. "Holders of record" for
hedge funds are generally the investors. Id.
111. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)(B); SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 18-19.
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under section 12 by maintaining less than 500 holders of record. 12
Sections 13(d), 13(g), and 16(a) of the SEA require certain
disclosures by funds purchasing substantial "equity securities"
registered under section 12.113 These provisions place investors and
entities on notice that an entity may be targeted for takeover. 1 14 To
avoid registration with the SEC under these sections, hedge funds
restrict the amount within each class of equity securities that they
purchase. "15
3. Investment Company Act of 1940
Although domestic hedge funds typically fall under this
definition of an investment company, they often structure their
business to utilize exceptions and avoid registration and
regulation."16  Congress designed the ICA as a comprehensive
regulatory scheme to protect investors from the abusive practices of
investment companies. 117 Section 3(a)(1)(A) of the ICA defines an
investment company as "any issuer which... is or holds itself out as
being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the
business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities ... *,1 18
Many hedge funds rely on section 3(c)(1) of the ICA to avoid
regulation. Section 3(c)(1) exempts from the definition of
investment company, "[a]ny issuer whose outstanding securities
(other than short-term paper) are beneficially owned by not more
than one hundred persons and which is not making and does not
112. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 4135, at 18.-19.
113. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (g); 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a); SEC STAFF REPORT,
supra note 35, at 19-20. The term "equity securities" includes securities
convertible into equity securities, warrants, and rights to subscribe to or
purchase equity securities. Gibson, supra note 57, at 692 n.87 (citing HAZEN,
supra note 89, at 224). When a party purchases more than five percent of a
class of registered equity securities, section 13(g) requires the party to make
substantial disclosures to the SEC. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 19-
20; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (g). When a party purchases at least ten percent of a
class of registered equity securities, section 16 requires further disclosures to
the SEC. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 20; 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a).
114. See Gibson, supra note 57, at 692-93.
115. Jonathan H. Gatsik, Hedge Funds: The Ultimate Game ofLiar's Poker,
35 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 591, 612 (2001).
116. See Gibson, supra note 57, at 694.
117. Id. at 693.
118. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A).
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presently propose to make a public offering of its securities. ' I 9 To
comply with section 3(c)(1), hedge funds must not make, or propose
to make, public offerings, and can avoid making such offerings by
complying with section 4(2) of the SA.120 A corporation, registered
investment company, or hedge fund using section 3(c)(1) to avoid
regulation, counts as only one investor for the purposes of the section
3 (c)(1) exemption. 121
Hedge funds use section 3(c)(7) as an alternative to section
3(c)(1) to avoid regulation under the ICA. 122 Section 3(c)(7) requires
that: (i) fund securities to be owned exclusively by qualified
purchasers; and (ii) the fund refrain from making a public offering.
123
Qualified purchasers include individuals or families maintaining a
minimum of five million in investments, certain trusts, or any person
who owns and discretionarily invests over twenty-five million
dollars.124 One advantage for hedge funds using the section 3(c)(7)
exemption is that they can conceivably take on an unlimited number
of qualified investors. 125 Another advantage of employing section
119. Id. § 80a-3(c)(1). Offshore hedge funds can exclude non-United States
investors in determining compliance with section 3(c)(1). SEC STAFF REPORT,
supra note 35, at 11 n.33.
120. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 12. Section 4(2) of the
Securities Act exempts "transactions by an issuer not involving any public
offering." 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2). This is almost an identical requirement as that
of section 3(c)(1) of the ICA. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
121. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 11. When a corporation,
registered investment company, or unregistered hedge fund owns more than 10
percent of the voting securities of the principle fund, then each of the company
or hedge fund investors counts as an investor in the section 3(c)(1) exempt
principle fund. Id. at 11 n.34; see PORTFOLIO STRATEGIES, supra note 99, at
155-57; Gibson, supra note 57, at 694-95.
122. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 12. Section 3(c)(7) exempts
"[a]ny issuer, the outstanding securities of which are owned exclusively by
persons who, at the time of acquisition of such securities, are qualified
purchasers, and which is not making and does not at that time propose to make
a public offering of such securities." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7)(A) (2000).
123. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 12-13. In 1996 Congress added
this exemption because it judged that qualified purchasers were sufficiently
sophisticated to evaluate the quality and risk of the hedge fund they
contemplated investing in. Id. at 13 (citing S. REP. No. 104-293, at 10 (1996)).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A)(ii)-(iv); Gibson, supra note 57, at 695-96.
125. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 13. However, to avoid regulation
and reporting under the SEA, the number of investors must be below 499, and
to avoid registration under the IAA, the fund must take on less than fifteen
investors. Id. at 13, 21.
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3(c)(7) is that at no point does a look-through provision kick in as
under 3(c)(1). 126 The one caveat is that the hedge fund manager
must ensure that no one forms a corporate investor solely to invest in
the fund, since such a corporation does not qualify for the qualified
purchaser label.1
27
4. Investment Advisers Act of 1940
One who qualifies as an investment adviser must register with
the SEC and follow SEC rules for investment advisers. 128 The SEC
estimates that two-thirds of hedge fund advisers are unregistered.
129
The IAA defines an investment adviser as:
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business
of advising others, either directly or through publications or
writings, as to the value of securities or as to the
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities,
or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business,
issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning
securities .... 130
Hedge fund advisers avoid registration under the IAA by using
the private adviser exception contained in section 3(b)(3),
withholding investment advisor status from "any investment adviser
who during the course of the preceding twelve months has had fewer
than fifteen clients and who [does not hold] himself out generally to
the public as an investment adviser .... "131 Hedge fund advisors
remain unregistered pursuant to section 3(b)(3) by maintaining fewer
than 15 clients, not holding themselves out to the public as
investment advisers, and not acting as investment advisers to
126. Id. at 13.
127. Id. at 13 & n.41. A corporation formed to invest in a hedge fund is still
a qualified purchaser if each of its "beneficial owner[s]" is a qualified
purchaser. Id. at 13 n.41.
128. Id. at 20-21. Investment advisors must also keep the SEC and their
investors informed about matters, including their disciplinary history and
current practices, by filing a current disclosure form with the SEC and
disclosure statement for clients. Id. Registered investment advisers must,
among other requirements, maintain required books and records and submit to
periodic examinations by the SEC. Id. at 21.
129. Id. at 22.
130. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(ll) (2000).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3).
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registered investment companies. 132 As under the ICA, corporations
and other hedge funds count as one investor.
133
The antifraud provisions of the IAA, however, still affect
unregistered hedge fund advisors. 134 Under the antifraud provisions
of the IAA, hedge fund advisors cannot make material omissions or
misrepresentations to investors.
135
Summarily, while hedge funds are subject to some minimal
protections of the securities acts, they avoid substantial regulation
and registration requirements through exceptions and exemptions to
the SA, SEA, ICA, and IAA. To qualify for these exceptions and
exemptions, hedge funds limit the number of their investors, refrain
from advertising, and set minimum wealth requirements for
investors. These compliance measures, however, do not ensure that
hedge funds affect only a small number of investors with minimum
requirements for wealth.
D. Current Risks Hedge Funds Pose to Investors and the Economy
Hedge funds currently place ordinary investors at risk by
exposing them to fraud involving mutual funds, misuse of leverage
that can lead to the potential for world financial crises, and
speculation drives the pricing of common securities and commod-
ities. Despite such risks to the investing community, the SEC knows
almost nothing about unregistered hedge funds. For the SEC to
effectively protect these investors, the SEC needs information about
the industry and its practices and has sensibly required, as approved
by the SEC board in October 2004, that hedge fund advisers register
with the agency.
132. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2001); SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at
21; see Gibson, supra note 57, at 698-99 (describing what "holding out"
means in more detail).
133. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3). The result of this no look-through clause
is that hedge funds can have hundreds of actual clients and manage enormous
sums of money and still qualify for the private adviser exemption. See
Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed.
Reg. 45,172, 45,173 (July 28, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279).
134. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 21.
135. See In re Taubenheim, SEC Order, Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
Release No. 1843 (Oct. 4, 1999), 1999 SEC LEXIS 2082, available at http:/
/www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-1843.htm.; Gibson, supra note 57, at 697
n.121.
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1. A general void of information
Currently, the SEC has "no oversight program that would
provide [it] with the ability to deter or detect fraud by unregistered
hedge fund advisers at an early stage."'136 Today's regulatory
controls "do not provide regulators with the authority to require
hedge funds to make comprehensive disclosures about their risk
management practices and their trading positions and exposures."'
' 37
What little the SEC knows about unregistered hedge funds it gleans
from third party data. Even large institutional investors have diffi-
culty obtaining the necessary information to adequately evaluate an
unregistered hedge fund.1
38
Leaving a one trillion dollar industry largely unregistered and
unregulated has significant consequences. Growth in the hedge fund
industry has been accompanied by growth in hedge fund fraud,
which directly affects hedge fund investors. 139 Hedge funds also
"have the potential to impact the U.S. financial markets [and ordi-
nary investors] significantly because, unlike mutual funds and
pension funds, hedge funds engage in more active, short-term trading
and use leverage more aggressively."'
140
In summary, a hedge fund or group of hedge funds pose the
following risks to the following groups: (i) fraud, which affects
hedge fund investors and ordinary investors, and (ii) reckless use of
leverage and irresponsible speculation, which affects all investors as
well as world markets. 14 1 Without regulation or registration, hedge
funds can cause enormous disruptions to investors and world markets
virtually undetected by the SEC. 1
42
136. SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,177.
137. Gibson, supra note 57, at 704.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 45,175-76. But see id. at 45,197 (Glassman, Atkins,
Comm'rs, dissenting) (stating that the SEC Staff Report did not find a
significant increase in fraud).
140. See Gibson, supra note 57, at 685 (citing REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND
THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPrrAL MANAGEMENT 2 (1999)); PAUL
KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION EcoNoMIcs 118-36 (1999).
141. SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,175-80.
142. See Gatsik, supra note 115, at 591-93 (describing how the hedge fund
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) nearly took world markets to the
brink); see generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE
AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2001) (providing a more
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2. Hedge fund fraud affecting hedge fund investors
The SEC states that the commission has brought forty-six fraud
actions 143 against hedge funds by the commission in the five years
leading up to 2004.1 Hedge fund fraud accounts for at least an
estimated one billion dollars in losses to investors. 145 The types of
fraud actions the SEC has brought against unregistered hedge fund
advisers include "misappropriation of assets, portfolio pumping,
misrepresentation of portfolio performance, falsification of
experience, credentials and past returns, misleading disclosure
regarding claimed trading strategies and improper valuation of
assets."' 
16
The SEC has brought many actions for misrepresentation of
portfolio performance with hedge fund advisers grossly overstating
returns for extended periods. 147 Valuation problems contribute to
thirty-five percent of hedge fund failures and are driven by the
adviser's need to show consistent performance and the overall
complexity of hedge fund portfolios. 148 The SEC has also brought
actions against advisers paying "unnecessary and undisclosed
commissions.' 49 Hedge fund advisers have also been indicted for
detailed account of LTCM).
143. SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins has challenged the significance of the
forty-six fraud actions. SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,198 nn.14-15
(Glassman, Atkins, Comm'rs, dissenting); SEC Crime Spree, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 27, 2004, at A18.
144. SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,175.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 45,179.
147. Id. at 45,175; see also New York Hedge Fund Manager Haligiannis
Indicted for Fraud, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 30, 2004, at C2 (reporting the
arrest and charges filed by the SEC against the president of the Sterling
Watters Group hedge fund for allegedly cheating investors out of tens of
millions of dollars by informing them of a 1,565% return while the fund was
actually losing money). The SEC Proposed Rule highlights the following
actions among other civil actions alleging similar fraud: SEC v. Jung,
Litigation Release No. 17,417 (Mar. 15, 2002); SEC v. Mobley, Litigation
Release No. 18,150 (May 1, 2001); SEC v. Berger, Litigation Release No.
17230 (Feb. 27, 2003). SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,175 n.40.
148. See SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,179 (citing Christopher
Kundro & Stuart Feffer, Valuation Issues and Operational Risk in Hedge
Funds, Capco White Paper (Dec. 2003), available at http://www.cap
co.com/uploadedFiles/Capco instituteNaluationlssuesWhitepaperDocument/j
10art06.pdf (subscription required) (on file with Loyola Law Review)).
149. Id. at 45,175 & n.40. The SEC Proposed Rule cites In re Portfolio
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using "parallel unregistered advisory firms and hedge funds as
vehicles to misappropriate client assets."' 150 Due to a lack of "basic
information about hedge fund advisers and the hedge fund
industry,"' 151 it is entirely possible that fraud within the industry and
amongst advisers takes on many more shapes and forms and is far
more pervasive than the forty-six representative cases the SEC has
filed in the last five years.1
52
Relevant to fraud committed against hedge fund investors, the
recurring justification for the use of exceptions and exemptions that
leave the hedge fund industry largely unregistered and unregulated is
that wealthy investors are more sophisticated and less susceptible to
fraud.153 In practice, "sophisticated professional investors can be just
as vulnerable as amateurs."'1 54 The complex nature of hedge funds
requires due diligence that even sophisticated investors cannot
perform.
155
3. Hedge fund fraud affecting ordinary investors
Hedge fund advisers have played a central role in the recent
market timing and late trading' 56 scandals brought to the forefront by
Advisory Servs., LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2038 (June 20,
2002). SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,175 n.41.
150. SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,175. The SEC Proposed Rule
cites the following enforcement action as an example: SEC v. Hoover,
Litigation Release No. 17,487 (Apr. 24, 2002), Litigation Release No. 17,981
(Feb. 11, 2003). SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 14,175 n.42.
151. SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,177.
152. Id.
153. Securities regulations exceptions and exemptions use terms such as
accredited investor, holder of record, and qualified purchaser, and cases refer
to wealthy investors that can fend for themselves. See supra notes 87-135 and
accompanying text; KRUGMAN, supra note 140, at 120.
154. Randall Smith, Affinity Fraud: Harvard Parents Got a Hard Lesson in
Investing Perils, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2004, at Al (telling the story of Karen
Fleiss, a hedge fund adviser, who was defrauded out of a $1.8 million dollar
investment by Gregory Earls, a contact she knew through the Harvard
University Parents Fund). This controversy was significant in that Ms. Fleiss,
a sophisticated investor, became involved in the fraudulent investment out of
respect for Mr. Earls and the appeal of his promised investment (much the
same way many investors probably become involved with unregistered hedge
funds). Id.
155. See Tomsho, supra note 85.
156. Market timing, legal but discouraged by mutual fund prospectuses, is
the practice of "rapidly buying and selling mutual-fund shares in order to profit
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New York Attorney General ("NYAG") Elliot Spitzer. Many SEC
"enforcement cases involve[ ] hedge funds that sought to exploit
mutual fund investors for their own gain."'157 Typically, hedge fund
advisers strike deals with mutual fund advisers, mutual fund
management, or brokers, which allow them to engage in late trading
and/or market timing.'5 8 In exchange for providing late trading and
market timing privileges, mutual fund advisers, management, and
brokers see higher returns on their investments in the hedge funds
and/or receive "sticky assets."' 5 9 The SEC estimates that as many as
forty different hedge funds are involved in market timing and late
trading cases.
Canary Investment Management, LLC, managed hedge funds
engaged in market timing schemes. 160 What did the SEC know about
Canary and its widespread use of market timing strategies? The SEC
contended, "Because the advisers to these hedge funds were un-
registered, our examination staff had no opportunity to review their
from discrepancies between the fund's share price and the values of its
underlying holdings." Allison Bisbey Colter, Investors Take Their Money and
Run from Tainted Hedge Funds, THE RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Feb. 6,
2004, at B 1. Late trading, an illegal and highly unfair practice, allows
investors placing orders after the 4 P.M. Eastern Standard Time cut-off to
obtain the same day price and not, as is normal, the next day price. See id.
Late trading allows hedge funds to invest based on news that comes out after
the 4 P.M. trading bell. See id.
157. SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,157.
158. See id. at 45,175 n.43.
159. Id. at 45,175. "Sticky assets" are "placement of other assets in other
funds managed by the mutual fund adviser." Id. The SEC has recently
brought an increased number of market timing actions against mutual funds,
involving hedge fund improprieties, including: SEC v. Columbia Mgmt.
Advisors, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18,590 (Feb. 24, 2004) ("[A]lleging
mutual fund adviser entered into arrangements allowing hedge funds to engage
in market timing transactions in nine funds, including one aimed at young
investors") and In re Banc One Inv. Advisers Corp., Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 2254 (June 29, 2004) ("Commission found that investment adviser
permitted hedge fund manager to time the adviser's mutual funds, contrary to
the funds' prospectuses; helped arrange financing for the timing trades; failed
to disclose the timing arrangements; and provided the hedge fund manager
with nonpublic portfolio information."). SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at
45,175 n.43.
160. Id.; Complaint, New York v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC, (Sept. 3,
2003), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/canary_complaint.pdf (un-
filed version of complaint).
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trading activities in the mutual funds."'161 Consequently, the Canary
hedge funds made a profit of eighty-five million dollars off of market
timing.162 The mutual fund managers took large management fees
from the sticky assets left in their funds, and intermediaries such as
the Security Trust Co. received millions directly from Canary.
163
Additionally, parent companies of mutual fund managers and other
lenders earned high-yield interest on money borrowed by Canary to
finance its late trading and market timing activities. 164 While all this
money was being made, "long-term investors in the mutual funds
targeted by Canary lost tens of millions of dollars."'
' 65
4. Hedge funds affecting world markets-
Merriweather and Long Term Capital Management
The failure of obscenely overleveraged large funds can cause
significant waves in international financial markets. Traditionally,
funds obtained leverage "by purchasing securities with borrowed
money, [but] today futures, options and other derivative contracts
[are a] major source of leverage."'166 Funds use leverage to increase
profits, but when a fund does not make enough money to cover its
borrowing costs, the use of leverage endangers the fund's
viability. 167 Enacted in response to investment trusts' reckless use of
leverage in the 1920s, 168 the IAA limits and imposes restrictions on
the use of leverage by a regulated hedge fund or corporation
qualifying as an investment company. 1
69
An example of a hedge fund misusing leverage occurred in the
late 1990s when Long Term Capital Management, L.P., ("LTCM'"'),
161. SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,176 n.44. SEC commissioners
Glassman and Atkins argue that a hedge fund adviser disclosure would not
have made a difference as the SEC failed to discover market timing and late
trading by mutual funds that are regulated and registered. See id. at 45,198
(Glassman, Atkins, Comm'rs, dissenting).




166. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 37.
167. See Gibson, supra note 57, at 687-88 (explaining that when borrowing
costs exceed profits, hedge funds may have to sell assets to satisfy the demands
of their creditors).
168. See supra at Part II.B.3.
169. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 38-39, & 39 nn.131-35.
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the company that operated Long Term Capital Portfolio, almost
defaulted. 7 ° LTCM's trading strategy caused the fund to lose
substantial sums, primarily due to economic problems in Russia.
17 1
In reality, LTCM's loss resulted from using borrowed money to
purchase about $120 billion of its estimated $125 billion in assets,
causing the fund to be leveraged twenty-five times over. 7 2 When a
highly leveraged fund like LTCM fails, it often depletes its entire
existing capital. 173 This causes creditors to liquidate their collateral
assets so that they can protect themselves from the hedge fund's
failure, and as a result, markets decline. 174  Some of the fund's
creditors and lending counterparties feared what were predicted to be
"extreme price movements in the credit and interest rate markets" on
account of investors liquidating their positions in LTCM. 175 These
parties, facilitated by banking regulators, bailed out the fund.
176
The immediate response to LTCM did not result in regulation of
the hedge fund industry or supervision of leverage practices. 177 The
financial securities industry, however, tightened its credit risk
management practices, and financial regulators "implemented guide-
lines for regulated entities when extending credit through either
lending or counterparty relationships."'
178
In addition to dangerous uses of leverage, regulators fear that
hedge funds are using manipulative schemes such as selling a
security short and issuing critical reports about the security issuer to
170. See Gatsik, supra note 115, at 591-93 (describing the LTCM story);
Gibson, supra note 57 at 681-82; see generally LOWENSTEIN, supra note 153
(giving a fuller account of LTCM manager John Meriweather and the fund's
activities).
171. See Gibson, supra note 57, at 681-82.
172. Diana B. Henriques & Joseph Kahn, Back from the Brink; Lessons of a
Long, Hot Summer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1998, at C1.
173. See Gibson, supra note 57, at 705-06.
174. See id.
175. Id. at 682 n.8.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 708 & n. 181 (citing Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking
and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. (1999) (testimony of Anne Nazareth, Director of
Division of Market Regulation, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
Concerning the Report of the President's Working Group on Financial Markets
on Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital
Management), available at 1999 WL 16947258).
178. Id.
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drive prices down.' 79 Although difficult to detect, an example of
hedge fund speculation may have been the increases in the price of
oil during September and October of 2004.180 Hedge fund
speculation schemes can thus affect all areas of the national and
global economies.181
Hedge fund fraud, misuse of leverage, and speculation pose
significant risks to investors and world markets. Accordingly, these
problems compel the SEC to act. The SEC needs information about
the industry and has sensibly required, as approved by the SEC board
in October 2004,182 that hedge fund advisers register with the agency.
Registration would allow the SEC to: (i) begin to understand the
hedge fund industry, (ii) attempt to curb some of the illegal activity
of individual funds and their advisers, and (iii) prevent market
disruptions by monitoring overleveraged funds.
IV. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS
Consistent with the history of securities regulation, the
appropriate solution to problems with the hedge fund industry is to
require registration of hedge fund advisers under the IAA. In
October 2004, the SEC moved in this direction by amending the
section 80b-3(b)(3) exemption to include a look-through definition of
the term "client" targeted at hedge fund advisers. Registration will
help the SEC discover fraud and prevent potential financial disasters.
Registration will also be a deterrent to advisers committing future
frauds and may render further regulation of the industry unnecessary.
Despite the utility of registration, many critics including top law
firms and hedge fund groups oppose the SEC's move. Their
concerns merit consideration, but are ultimately insignificant
compared to the utility of registration.
179. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 42 & n.146 (citing Randall
Smith, Regulators Review Complaints About Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Jan.
22, 2003).
180. See, e.g., Jonathan Fuerbringer, Guess Who's Pushing Up Oil Prices,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2004, at C8; Oil's Crude Awakening, FORTUNE, Sept. 6,
2004, at 31.
181. See Fuerbringer, supra note 180; Oil's Crude Awakening, supra note
180.
182. See SEC Press Release, supra note 6.
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A. Recommendation for Addressing
Concerns About the Hedge Fund Industry
Imposing the complete regulatory framework of the SA, the
SEA, the ICA, and the IAA on hedge funds would be consistent with
the original purpose of the acts. Such an approach, however, is not
necessary, nor politically feasible, at this time. Rather, simply
imposing the registration requirements of the IAA on hedge fund
advisers is a more sensible solution to problems in the hedge fund
industry.
The definition of a "client" of an investment adviser contained
in 17 C.F.R. 275.203(b)(3)-1 should be amended to bring hedge fund
advisers within the boundaries of these regulations. Currently, 17
C.F.R. 275.203(b)(3)-1 treats almost all legal entities, including
companies and hedge funds, as single clients. For hedge fund
advisers, section 275.203(b)(3)-1 should be amended to "look
through" all legal entities, such that the owners and investors in
companies, and hedge funds investing in another hedge fund count as
clients. Such an amendment would force many of the most
potentially problematic hedge funds (those funded by corporate and
institutional money) to register. The rule, however, should leave the
following groups unregistered as they are distinct from hedge funds:
(i) family partnerships and trusts, and (ii) entities subject to
regulation under the ICA but falling within the exception in section
3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) that do not permit investors to redeem their
interests in the fund within two years of purchase. 183
B. Why Changing the Definition of "Client"for
15 U S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3)s and Regulation of Hedge Funds is
Consistent with the History and Goals of Securities Regulation
The problematic practices that have driven the move toward
hedge fund registration and regulation are fraud, misuse of leverage,
and speculation.' 8 4 The SEC has taken the correct approach to these
problems by imposing part of the securities regulation framework-
183. See SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,184-85. The goal of these
exceptions is to: (i) maintain the IAA's exemption for small funds made up of
family and friends, and (ii) not encompass private equity funds and venture
capital funds. Id.
184. See supra Part III.D.
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the IAA-on the hedge fund industry. 185 Registration is necessary to
gauge the prevalence of problematic practices that hedge funds
currently engage in.
The legislative history behind the adoption of the securities acts
supports the registration of hedge fund advisers. The main problems
that securities markets faced coming out of the 1920s boom were
fraud, the use of leverage, and uncontrolled speculation.' 86 These
problems posed by investment trusts and their kin in the Depression
Era exist today in exactly the same manner in the hedge fund
industry.
During the Depression Era, the government responded to the
problems of the investment trusts by passing securities regulations in
order to restore public confidence and make capitalism live up to its
promise.' 87 The overarching theme of this system of regulations was
disclosure. 188 The proper response to the current growing concern
over hedge fund practices should be to incorporate this New Deal
framework. Requiring hedge fund advisers to register with the SEC
reflects the methods used to reign in the same problems posed by
investment trusts in the 1920s.
Furthermore, the goals of the IAA in particular are consistent
with the SEC's current aims of protecting investors and learning
more about hedge fund advisers. 189  The Act not only protects
advisers' clients but also serves as "a continuing census of the
Nation's investment advisers." 190 In 1940 Congress noted "that it
was difficult to ascertain the number of investment advisers in
operation or the amount of funds under their influence and
control."' 191 Registering hedge fund advisers provides the SEC with
such data and may be sufficient to protect investors, while staving off
the need for further regulation.
Congress created the specific exemption, section 80b-3(b)(3),
for advisers who have a few clients consisting of family and
185. See SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,178-87.
186. See supra Part II.A.
187. See supra Part II.B.
188. See id.
189. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 35, at 20-21.
190. SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,178 n.68 (citing H.R. REP. No.
86-1760, at 2 (1960)).
191. Id.
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friends. 192 Although used by hedge funds, Congress did not intend it
to be used by these fund managers, who by using the no look-
through policy, maintain in effect hundreds of clients and manage
hundreds of millions of dollars. Changing the definition of "client"
to look-through legal entities ensures that section 80b-3(b)(3) will be
used in a manner more closely related to its purpose.
C. Utility ofRegistration Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
Registration under the IAA would give the SEC information
about, among other things: (i) the number of hedge funds the adviser
manages, (ii) the amount of assets in the funds, (iii) employees of the
funds, (iv) clients of the funds, (v) other business activities that the
adviser conducts, and (vi) the identity of those in control of the fund.
By requiring disclosure of this information, the SEC expects to catch
more instances of fraud and gain enough information to prevent a
future Long Term Capital Management from once again taking
markets to the brink.
Registration also gives the SEC authority to conduct
examinations that serve the dual purpose of catching fraud in its
early stages and deterring future fraud. 193 The SEC could even bar
criminals and those with long disciplinary records from managing
funds. 194 Hedge fund advisers would also have to protect against the
adverse consequences of any conflicts of interest with their clients or
with the funds themselves. 195  Registration would compel
compliance with minimum requirements for investors under rule
192. See id. at 45,173 n.17, 45,182; Letter from Deborah Tuchman, Counsel,
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flor, to the SEC (Sept. 14, 2004) (on file
with SEC). The drafters left exceptions to securities laws, in part, under the
traditional view that sophisticated investors do not need protection. See
Comment from ABA Section of Business Law to the SEC 23-24 (Sept. 28,
2004) (responding to the SEC Proposed Rule dissent) (on file with SEC). The
basis for this proposition needs to be re-examined and reconsidered, not merely
accepted. See supra note 154, (showing that this premise is not a sound basis
for exceptions and exemptions from the securities acts). But see Hale & Dorr
Letter, supra note 8 (taking the position that the traditional approach to
securities law is still warranted, but, if not, that Congress, not the SEC, should
consider whether sophisticated investors need protection).
193. SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,173 n.17, 45,182.
194. See id. at 45,179-80.
195. See id. at 45,180.
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205-3 of the act and limit any retailization 96 that may be occurring
in the hedge fund industry. 197 In summary, registration will help the
SEC discover fraud, prevent potential financial disasters, and deter
advisers from committing future frauds.
198
D. The Arguments Against Registration
Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
Critics of registration assert the following: (i) registration would
move the hedge fund industry offshore; 199 (ii) the SEC does not have
the legal authority to redefine the term "client" under section 80b-
3(b)(3);200 (iii) appropriate regulatory framework already exists;
20 1
(iv) the SEC has no evidence of retailization;20 2 (v) the proposal
impedes the growth of the industry;20 3 and (vi) the SEC lacks
sufficient resources to deal with the increased registration. 20 4 These
objections are valid, yet unpersuasive.
If requiring registration caused a race to move offshore, then the
SEC rule certainly would defeat its own purpose. Such a race is
unlikely to occur. The choice to move offshore is already available
to hedge fund advisers, yet up to one half of the top one hundred
hedge funds have chosen to stay in the United States and are
currently registered under the IAA.20 5 None of the registered hedge
fund advisers have stated that registration made them less
196. Retailization is the expansion of hedge fund investment. See id. at
45,176.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 45,187-89.
199. Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Alan Greenspan, expressed concerns
that regulation of the hedge fund industry would drive it overseas, where
federal oversight would diminish even more. Hedge Fund Operations:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs., 105th Cong. 26
(1998). Off-shore hedge funds present issues unto themselves which are
beyond the scope of this Note.
200. See Managed Funds Comment, supra note 7 (summarizing the
arguments against registration); Hale & Dorr Letter, supra note 8, at 1-8.
201. See Managed Funds Comment, supra note 7.
202. See id. This Note does not address the issue of retailization. The SEC
discusses concerns about retailization of hedge funds in its Proposed Rule. See
SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,176-77, 45,180-81.
203. See Managed Funds Comment, supra note 7.
204. See id.
205. See Henny Sender & Deborah Solomon, SEC Plans to Propose New
Hedge-Fund Rules, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2004, at C4.
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206competitive. Rather, this might indicate a preference among
investors for American hedge funds and American hedge fund
advisers about whom more reliable information is available.,
The SEC proposed rule addressed offshore hedge funds,
requiring such fund advisers to look though all funds they manage
and count investors that are United States residents as clients.
20 7
Thus, if a fund advised more than fourteen United States clients,
under the proposed rule's look-through provision, it would have to
register despite a move offshore. Unless hedge funds are willing to
forego United States residents' capital, there will not be strong
incentive to move offshore.
Critics of registration also argue that Congress, not the SEC, has
legal authority to define the word "client" for purposes of 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-3(b)(3). In support of this argument they assert the following:
(i) the plain meaning of the word "client" does not include legal
entities; 2°8 (ii) the commission report and early Supreme Court case
understood the adviser-client relationship to be one of personalized
advice;209 (iii) Congress "indisputably" intended to except from
registration any adviser whose clients were strictly investment
companies; 2 10 (iv) Congressional amendments show that the SEC has
no power to change the definition of the word "client"; 211 (v) the
SEC's previous dealings with the definition of the word "client"
comported with a no look-through interpretation and occurred when
the SEC had authority to address the issue; 212 and (vi) Congress has
consistently excluded hedge funds from regulation under the ICA.213
These arguments do not directly address the overarching claim
that the SEC lacks authority to define the term "client," except for
(v), which expressly acknowledges that the SEC had the authority in
the past to define the term. Section 80b-1 l(a) of the IAA gives the
SEC "authority to classify, by rule, persons and matters within [its]
jurisdiction and to prescribe different requirements for different
classes of persons, as necessary or appropriate to the exercise of [its]
206. See SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,180.
207. Id.; see id. at 45,183.
208. Hale & Dorr Letter, supra note 8, at 1-8.
209. Id. at 5.
210. Id. at 6.
211. Id. at 6-8.
212. Id. at 1-2.
213. Id. at 2-3.
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authority under the Act." 214 The historical interpretation of the word
"client" as defined in 17 C.F.R. 275.203(b)(3)-l did not look through
corporate entities.215 The SEC, however, for many years has had
constitutional authority in that section to define the term "client."
216
Further, Congress, probably intended that the exception contained in
IAA section 80b-3(b)(3) apply to those who advised a small group of
family and friends-not hedge fund advisers (who did not exist until
1949) 2 1 7-making the use of SEC authority appropriate. 218  The
SEC's "client" interpretation is also the opposite of how the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") interpreted the
Commodities Exchange Act ("CEA""). Pursuant to constitutional
authority, the CFTC counted each partner in a limited partnership
and each stock holder in a corporation as a client until 2003.219
Thus, the SEC, like the CFTC, can reinterpret the word "client."
The next concern voiced by the opposition is that a proper
regulatory framework already exists. 220 The argument is that hedge
funds are already subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the IAA, and
hedge funds and their managers are also subject to other Federal
regulations.221 This concern is not a critique of the SEC's proposed
rule, but a claim that there is no hedge fund problem. The SEC and
others concede, however, that there are problems with undetected
fraud, speculation, and the misuse of leverage in the hedge fund
industry that need to be addressed.222 From Long Term Capital
Management to the Canary Group, the record speaks for itself.
When the chief regulatory body for securities knows little about
unregistered hedge funds at the center of emerging financial
scandals, 223 it is obvious that there is no appropriate regulatory
214. SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,194 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3,
80b-4, 80b-6(4), and 80b-1 l(a) as authority for amending the definition of the
word "client").
215. See id.
216. See id. at 45,194.
217. See Hale & Dorr Letter, supra note 8, at 8.
218. See supra notes 128-135 and accompanying text (describing the
fifteen-or-fewer investor requirement of the IAA exception).
219. See SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,182.
220. See Managed Funds Comment, supra note 7.
221. See id.
222. See SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,172; Comment from ABA
Section of Business Law to the SEC 24 (Sept. 28, 2004).
223. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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framework already in place.
The argument that there is no retailization in the hedge fund
industry has some merit. Presumably, if hedge funds remain in the
hands of only the wealthiest investors, these investors do not need
SEC protection. Ordinary investors who entrust their money to a
mutual fund or a pension fund, however, have felt negative effects
from the hedge fund industry, most notably in the recent market-
timing and late trading scandals.224 Hedge fund speculation, such as
George Soros's fund22 5 that was at least partly responsible for the
devaluation of the British Pound in 1992 and over-leveraged
disasters like Long Term Capital Management, also potentially affect
ordinary investors. The need for more information on this expansive
industry, which has such a pervasive impact on ordinary investors,
overshadows the issue of retailization.
Opponents also voice the concern that the rule will impede the
growth of the industry and entrepreneurship. Most notably, critics
cite the increased costs posed by registration.226 Hedge fund
advisers, however, are not unsophisticated investors with limited
financial resources. Critics seek to portray them as helpless in
dealing with the filing requirements of the LAA and the costs of such
filings. This is a false image-hedge fund advisers necessarily have
established wealth or have tapped into the wealthier parts of society,
since the government limits advertising hedge funds and minimum
investment requirements are often above $500,000. The trans-
actional cost of registration would stop a struggling entrepreneur
with limited access to capital, but likely would not impede a hedge
fund adviser. Further, any judgment as to the effects of the rule on
the growth of the industry is speculative. Given the fact that one-
third of hedge funds are already currently registered, there is no
reason to believe the industry will suffer.227
Finally, opponents of regulation claim that the SEC lacks
sufficient resources to make the rule effective. The SEC, however,
224. SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,175-76.
225. See Patrick McGeehan, Portfolios, Etc., N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2000, at
CIO.
226. See Managed Funds Comment, supra note 7.
227. The existence of a burgeoning market for registered hedge funds does
not support an argument that required registration would curb the growth of the
industry. See SEC Proposed Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 45,189. Registration also
could legitimize the hedge fund industry. See id.
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has anticipated an increased workload, 28 and registration would
allow the SEC to engage in deterrence-targeted, individual
examinations that do not expend excessive resources.229 The goals
of registration can be accomplished without closely examining every
hedge fund filing.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite a lack of reliable data, the SEC has identified fraud,
misuse of leverage, and speculation as some of the risks that the
hedge fund industry poses to investors and global economic markets.
Currently, the SEC lacks the ability to deter or detect fraud by
unregistered hedge fund advisers. Today's regulatory controls do not
require hedge funds to make comprehensive disclosures about their
risk management practices, trading positions, or exposures. As the
chief regulatory body for securities, the SEC needs access to more
information about the hedge fund industry in order to prevent fraud
and broad market disruptions.
The SEC's concerns about the hedge fund industry are identical
to those that drove regulation of the investment trusts and their kin
during the New Deal. During the New Deal, the federal government
regulated securities, in part to manage the problems posed by
investment trusts. The context and purpose with which securities
regulations were originally passed support regulation of the hedge
fund industry under the SA, SEA, ICA, and IAA. Such regulation,
however, is not necessary nor politically feasible today.
The appropriate solution to problems with the hedge fund
industry is to require hedge fund advisers to register under the IAA.
The SEC has moved in this direction by approving a proposed rule in
October 2004, amending the section 80b-3(b)(3) exemption to
include a look-through definition of the term "client," targeted at
hedge fund advisers. Registration will give the SEC necessary
information to begin to understand the hedge fund industry and to
attempt to curb some of the illegal activity of individual funds and
their advisers. Registration will also prevent market disruptions by
monitoring overleveraged funds. Registration will thus allow the
SEC to more effectively discover and handle threats posed by hedge
228. See id. at 45,189-90.
229. See id. at 45,188.
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funds. Furthermore, registration may render further regulation of the
industry unnecessary.
Although the SEC approved the proposed rule requiring
registration of hedge fund advisers, future implementation of the rule
is far from certain. Many oppose registration, including top law
firms and hedge fund groups. Continuing to allow the hedge fund
industry to operate in a pre-New Deal state, however, puts investors
and world markets at risk, much as they were in the years leading up
to and during the Great Depression. Registration will provide the
SEC with the much needed sunlight in the form of reliable
information necessary to disinfect the hedge fund industry and
prevent major financial market disruptions.
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